Will China help Obama fight the Islamic State?

BEIJING, China — The Islamic State is flush with cash, territorially ambitious and eager for recognition.

But is IS a threat to China?

That’s been a question on foreign policy minds since US National Security Adviser Susan Rice’s trip to Beijing earlier this month.

The trip, billed as preparation for President Obama’s trip to China in November, went off without serious glitches — other than a mildly embarrassing mix-up on state TV with that other Rice (Condoleezza).

But Rice's visit was overshadowed by the unfolding chaos in Iraq and Syria, brought about by IS.

Would China be willing to lend its support to an international coalition against this growing threat to world security?

The official response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) was boilerplate: “The Chinese government staunchly fights against any form of terrorism.”

Privately, “They are interested,” argues Chen Dingding, assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau.

The Communist Party has long insisted on refusing to “interfere with the internal affairs” of sovereign states, a policy pointedly directed at other powers to stay out of China’s domestic matters.  But Beijing’s status — as the world’s second-biggest economy, with an increasingly powerful military — is bringing with it the uncomfortable realization that such a simplistic stance is getting tougher to maintain.

China now has its own overseas interests to protect — as demonstrated by its mass evacuation of troops from Libya in 2010 — and uneasy friendships with countries that have their own bad habits. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and incursions into Ukraine have met with only diplomatic blandishments from the People’s Republic. “A political solution is the only way… sanctions do not help to solve the underlying problems,” a MoFA spokesman said in early September.

In fact, as a gathering of scholars at an international conference in Stockholm recently concluded, China has been a main beneficiary of Russia’s aggression, securing a 30-year gas deal (long in the pipeline), oil and arms exports, energy exports and regional solidarity with its erstwhile foe — all while (or by) doing nothing.

The Islamic State may be a different matter, however. The terrorist group is already seeding unlikely alliances against it, such as Syria’s President Assad, Iran and the US. IS has included China among a list of avowed enemies and, reportedly, a Chinese national fighting for IS has already been captured by Iraqi forces, a fact that MoFA says they are “verifying,” while police in Indonesia say they have arrested four Chinese men accused of traveling there “with the intent of connecting with a local [IS] chief.”

If the captured Chinese IS fighter turns out to be a member of the Turkic-speaking Uighur population from Xinjiang, as is widely thought, it would be evidence that China has become a recruiting ground — and may even have IS cells. That renders a response unavoidable. (China has released no official figures on how many of its nationals have joined IS ranks, although its Middle East envoy has claimed that at least 100 Chinese were training with IS)

Xinjiang, an ethnically divided part of northwest China, has long been considered a hotbed of terrorism. Since April 2013, over 300 deaths have been reported in incidents that state media term as “terrorism” but are impossible to independently verify. This year, the violence has worsened and grown more public, spilling over into civilian attacks in outside provinces, such as a horrific massacre at a Kunming train station that left 34 dead and a suicide attack on Tiananmen Square that killed two bystanders. The arrival of any IS forces on Chinese borders could only intensify this unrest.

Chen Dingding has made a persuasive case for China’s involvement in battling IS, arguing that Beijing has nothing to lose, and could meanwhile gain from international standing, cooperation, and military experience.

Of course, it also risks exposing inexperienced People’s Liberation Army troops to potential defeat and loss of life (and face), as well as entanglement in contentious Middle Eastern politics. Then there’s the matter of domestic politics. “Some strategists in China have reservations on such cooperation because they view US-China relations as a zero-sum competition,” says Xiayu Pu, assistant professor at the University of Nevada’s Department of Political Science. “In their view, China should not do the US a favor.”

Most analysts therefore agree that China’s role is likely to be political and diplomatic: There will be no “boots on the ground” for the foreseeable future.

“China will stick to its non-interventionist policy for a while, though it might increase efforts in peacekeeping,” says Chen. “It will take time to adjust.”

Beijing’s waiting game may annoy some, but any attempts to rebuke China for complacency risk provoking outrage. After Obama suggested, in an August interview, that China had been a “free rider” in the region, an editorial in People’s Daily, a Beijing mouthpiece, argued that China was a “partner and builder,” while the US was an “invader and deserter.” The article didn’t mention that China’s first action since the emergence of IS was to evacuate all its 10,000 citizens in Iraq.

Labels aside, “Most would probably agree that China’s dominant strategy has been a low-profile approach in global affairs,” argues Xiaoyu. “From an analytical perspective, such a strategy is essentially a ‘free rider’ strategy. As an inward-looking emerging power, China wants to focus on domestic growth without active entanglement with global affairs.”

And if Obama does persuade a reluctant China to assist in maintaining what is still, essentially, a US-led world order and repair damage caused at least partly by its Middle East strategy, it might find having a new military partner at the table brings with it its own problems. “If China abandons its ‘free rider’ approach,” asks Xiaoyu, “will the US be ready to share more power and status with China on the world stage?”