The president-elect of Iran has a reformist reputation, and that helped him at the ballot box last week.
Masoud Pezeshkian overwhelmingly defeated an ultraconservative opponent in the election there.
The World’s host Marco Werman spoke with Sina Toossi, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, about what this means for politics in Iran, as well as predictions for how the new president will govern alongside Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Marco Werman: What does it mean, exactly, to be a reformist in Iran?
Sina Toossi: Ever since he’s been engaged in politics, he’s been on the reformist end of the spectrum in Iran; he has always tried to strike a more nonpartisan position within Iran’s political landscape, saying that he’s not with either conservative establishment parties or reformist establishment parties. But his politics have been very much on the reformist end of the spectrum. And his reputation within Iran is pro-reform.
He’s consistently criticized crackdowns by the government, whether in the 2009 Green Movement protests that we saw, then, also during the 2022 “Women, Life, Freedom” protests where he went on state television and publicly criticized the killing of Mahsa Amini.
He’s consistently criticized crackdowns by the government, whether in the 2009 Green Movement protests that we saw, then, also during the 2022 “Women, Life, Freedom” protests where he went on state television and publicly criticized the killing of Mahsa Amini.
So, given all that history, what does it mean exactly to be a reformist in Iran today?
So, the reformist movement, as represented by the reformist establishment in Iran, has been very battered and has lost a lot of public legitimacy in recent years, especially with large parts of the electorate and many Iranians who are disillusioned with the political status quo — they had unmet expectations. Both with the administration of [Muhammad] Khatami and [Hassan] Rouhani, and many people reached the conclusion that given the entrenched, hard-line power centers and the unelected institutions, that the presidency doesn’t have enough power to bring about the change that they would like to see.
But Pezeshkian won over a hard-line rival in an election where turnout in the first round of this election reached a historic low of 40%, which reflected widespread disillusionment in the political process. In the second round, when it was him against a very radical conservative, turnout increased to 50%. And I think both of these factors, both the low turnout and the percentage of the electorate that did turn out and voted for Pezeshkian, it’s a clear message of a desire for change from the Iranian people.
But Pezeshkian won over a hard-line rival in an election where turnout in the first round of this election reached a historic low of 40%, which reflected widespread disillusionment in the political process. In the second round, when it was him against a very radical conservative, turnout increased to 50%. And I think both of these factors, both the low turnout and the percentage of the electorate that did turn out and voted for Pezeshkian, it’s a clear message of a desire for change from the Iranian people.
You also mentioned the death of Mahsa Amini and the mass protests that followed. Will people who have protested against the regime in Iran find relief or protection with Pezeshkian?
Yes, so, Iran’s civil society and human rights activists and political prisoners have been split on Pezeshkian, have been split on participating in this election. So, we saw that there were many pro-democracy activists who, in the past, had participated in elections and voted for reformist candidates, and they said that they opposed participating in these elections.
But at the same time, we saw prominent pro-democracy activists and political prisoners like Keyvan Samimi, who wrote a big article that gained a lot of traction in Iran, arguing for the need to vote for Pezeshkian, and that in their fight against authoritarianism, that the reformist government would be someone they could negotiate better with and bring about more positive changes, especially when the alternative was a much more hard-line candidate.
But at the same time, we saw prominent pro-democracy activists and political prisoners like Keyvan Samimi, who wrote a big article that gained a lot of traction in Iran, arguing for the need to vote for Pezeshkian, and that in their fight against authoritarianism, that the reformist government would be someone they could negotiate better with and bring about more positive changes, especially when the alternative was a much more hard-line candidate.
Right. And of course, looming all over this, is the ultimate political authority in Iran. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah [Ali] Khamenei. How would you describe the relationship between him and Iranian reformists? And is that where Pezeshkian, do you think, will find his reformist ambitions really called into check?
Pezeshkian has differentiated himself from the approach of Rouhani, or Khatami by explicitly saying that he does not want to take a confrontational approach to Khamenei and his policy frameworks, and that he wants to act within the policy frameworks of the supreme leader. And Khamenei, after this period of really the failure of this conservative government in kind of bringing about positive development for the Iranian people, may decide to give some concessions towards the reformist camp and Pezeshkian in the wake of these protests to bring about some changes. But that remains to be seen.
I’m wondering how much influence Pezeshkian will have over Iran’s foreign policy. Could you imagine Iran’s role in several regional conflicts changing when he becomes president?
Yeah. So, the overall strategic direction of Iran’s foreign policy, the president can’t change. That is that by the supreme leader. The [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] basically runs the regional policy with respect to Israel, Iran’s support for Hezbollah, for Hamas. Pezeshkian is not going to be able to decisively change Iranian foreign policy, but he will be able to do things like prioritize a serious diplomatic process with the United States to try to restore some kind of nuclear deal and negotiate, perhaps more effectively, on these regional theaters.
What is the single, biggest challenge facing Masoud Pezeshkian as he begins his term as president?
The effect of sanctions has really been the main cause of economic malaise and stagnation in Iran for many years now. And these difficult economic conditions that have contributed to a lot of people not voting, or a lot of people hoping that Pezeshkian could change the situation, so whether he can get the lifting of some of these sanctions or not is going to be decisive for his legacy.
This interview has been lightly edited and condensed for clarity.
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