Saudi recognition of Shia minority’s grievances requires adjustment in government

TEL AVIV — The Shia minority in Saudi Arabia, comprising 10 to 15 percent of the population, has what can best be described as a rocky relationship with the ruling Sunni Al-Saud family.

Located primarily in the oil-rich Eastern Province, there remain deep-seated perceptions among many Sunni citizens that Shiism is heretical. The Shia population counters with allegations of institutionalized discrimination.

Shia demands for change have triggered periods of increased demonstrations, including on a larger-scale in 1979 and 1980, and again in 2011 and 2012 when they coincided with unrest across the region referred to as the “Arab Spring.”

The Eastern Province’s Qatif region has remained a focal point for the Shia opposition. Saudi authorities often characterize the opposition as supported by “foreign elements,” generally referring to its regional rival, Iran. In a BBC documentary, broadcast at the end of May, it was described as a “secret uprising.”

The 2011-12 demonstrations featured in the documentary were not secret, however. News articles from Western media covering these protests can be found online.

The stories describe peak turnouts in the hundreds or higher, accompanied by reports of Molotov cocktails, tire fires and police dispersal. Since then, opposition gatherings have diminished. Recently, they have consistently drawn participation in the one to low dozens and concluded without incident; protests that cannot be characterized as “uprisings.” Neither can sporadic incidents of gunfire directed toward police in Qatif that have died down recently but were recorded on a fairly regular basis during the second half of 2013 and the beginning of this year.

There has been a notable decrease in violence or unrest, particularly following a February security raid in a Qatif neighborhood that saw four killed. At the end of February, two Shia clerics, Sheikh Jaafar al-Rebeh and Sheikh Abdul Karim al-Hubail, rejected violence in their Friday sermons and became two of 10 clerics that signed onto a March statement denouncing violence as a means of achieving Shia demands.

On March 14, al-Hubail also called for dialogue with the state. So far, however, on-the-ground change has been minimal. Arrests of Shia activists continue, including two that were issued death sentences in May.

This is not to say that gestures from the authorities are absent. Dr. Lamia al-Brahim, a Shia, was appointed as the Ministry of Health’s director of health education in May. In addition, the Ministry of Interior reportedly launched an investigation into allegations of sectarian strife by 40 Shia citizens against a Twitter user. Yet, while addressing allegations, including inequality in employment, they appear more symbolic than part of a broader policy aimed at changing day-to-day realities. Meanwhile, al-Hubail’s call for dialogue remains unanswered.

Saudi authorities recognize that answering the Shia community’s grievances will require some form of recognition that they are legitimate and not the product of foreign backers. It will also necessitate adjustment in Sunni perceptions. Failing to enact concrete change will allow the status quo to linger, which should concern the Saudis more than an uprising that has largely receded.

This is because the status quo is unacceptable to the Shia population. On the other hand, it is satisfactory to Saudi authorities, given declining opposition activity and violence.

In the long term, Saudi inaction coupled with ongoing arrests can reinvigorate the Shia opposition, particularly the more radical elements that see nonviolence as incapable of bringing about change.

Meanwhile, the younger generation sees on social media various methods available for use during “revolutions,” as reports of gunfire and Molotov cocktails highlight the existence of more radicalized elements already willing to engage in violence.

One needs only to look to its neighbor, Bahrain, for an example of how such violence can steadily increase. There, an increase in unsophisticated militancy among a three-year strong Shia opposition can likely be attributed to frustration at the inability of the nonviolent approach to effect change.

Saudi Arabia is no Bahrain, but the country doesn’t want a radicalized Shia opposition where its primarily source of revenue is located. While a new anti-terror law passed in February can provide legal justification for any crackdown, the authorities should consider a more long-term solution for a correspondingly long-term problem.

Indications that such an approach would be supported can also be found in the pages of Saudi newspapers, with condemnations of a discriminatory Twitter campaign, support for the Shia’s non-violent approach and discussions of sectarianism.

As the country moves gradually toward women’s reform, a “slow but steady” approach also seems appropriate vis-à-vis the Shia population. It is not unprecedented, as indicated by the easing of some restrictions that followed the 1979 and 1980 protests. Public observance of the Shia holy day, Ashura, is also now permitted in certain areas.

If Saudi Arabia can become accustomed to women’s education and their increasing presence in the workforce, Saudis can also get used to high-ranking Shia officials and more Shia mosques.

Miriam Goldman is a senior intelligence analyst specializing in Gulf affairs at MAX Security Solutions, a geopolitical risk consulting firm based in the Middle East. Her graduate work in Middle Eastern Studies focused on Saudi Arabia.