What happens after the Mideast peace deadline passes with no framework?

DENVER — Israelis and Palestinians failed to reach any kind of agreement before the April 30 deadline set by Secretary of State John Kerry. So, what do the parties and the United States do now?

Even before negotiations ended, Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and President Mahmoud Abbas took actions that made the negotiations problematic. Netanyahu’s government issued 700 permits for apartment construction in contested areas of Jerusalem, and suspended Palestinian tax revenue transfers to the Palestinian finance ministry, on which the Palestinian Authority relies heavily for paying government salaries.

Abbas signed 15 United Nations conventions, some of which could lead to membership in UN organizations, a violation of a critical condition of the talks established by Kerry. In the coup de grace, Abbas then announced the fourth reconciliation agreement with Hamas, which does not recognize Israel and still advocates violence against the Jewish state, prompting an immediate Israeli withdrawal from the talks.

These actions contributed to a markedly worsening atmosphere of distrust, suspicion and stubborn refusal to compromise.

Collapse of the talks could leave the sides staring down a long road of hopelessness and unknown adverse fallout, perhaps for the duration of Obama’s presidency.

In Israel, some talk of annexation of “established” settlements. With more than 530,000 Israelis residing in 220-plus settlements in the West Bank, there is growing clamor to formalize the relationship of larger authorized settlements – against more than 100 unauthorized settlements – by incorporating them into Israel.

However, a government move toward annexation would cause immense internal and external harm to Israel. Even with Knesset and cabinet approval, annexation would meet formidable opposition from some Israelis, further riling Israel’s already highly polarized, divisive internal political dynamic.

Annexation would be challenged in Israel’s judicial system, including in its supreme court, well noted for its independence.

Depending on the breakdown of votes for annexation and on Netanyahu’s position, the decision might lead to a call for national elections, something the Israeli prime minister would not welcome after his hard fought re-election last year.

Annexation of even one settlement would end the two-state solution. Palestinians would conclude that Israel is not prepared to live beside an independent Palestinian state. There would be no possibility of restarting negotiations along the lines of the Oslo Accords of 1993 and UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Palestinians would seek statehood by other means, either peacefully through the UN, or very possibly violently, as organizations such as Hamas advocate.

Internationally, Israel would suffer considerably. No foreign government, not even the US, would recognize annexation. Some would take punitive measures, such as by the “boycott, divestment and sanctions” (BDS) movement now seen in Europe.

Pressure on European leaders to adopt BDS measures would rise. Importing more than one-third of Israel’s exports, the EU is Israel’s top export market. Even without formal governmental BDS action, political pressure on businesses everywhere, including in the US, to halt business with Israel, would increase dramatically.

Palestinians are contemplating equally disastrous actions. They have promised initiatives at the UN, including perhaps seeking membership in the International Criminal Court, which could allow them to bring charges against the Israeli government and even Israeli leaders.

Such action would prompt an immediate cutoff in US funding to the Palestinian Authority, and not just bilateral aid; also threatened is support provided through the World Bank, IMF and even the UN Relief and Works Agency, which supplies desperately needed aid to five million Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza. Other countries might follow.

Pursuing statehood at the UN would confirm many Israelis’ suspicion that Palestinians are not interested in negotiations and really want a UN-imposed independence, which neither Israel nor the US would ever accept. Could a UN-brokered Palestine state — unable to control its borders or carry out even the most basic functions of government — operate without the recognition of its major bordering state and biggest benefactor?

By ending negotiations, Abbas would hand rival Hamas a political victory. Hamas, which controls Gaza but is increasingly isolated after the declining fortunes of its Egyptian patron, the Muslim Brotherhood, would reap a significant political advantage from that concession from Abbas and his Fatah party.

Rational alternatives may be even fewer for the US. Were the US to walk away from Mideast talks, the US Democratic administration would hand another foreign policy failure to the Republicans in advance of November’s mid-term elections.

Democratic Party faithful, for whom pursuit of Mideast peace is an article of faith, would be chagrined by such resignation.

If not the suspension of negotiations, what then? Is it time for a US-proposed peace plan addressing core issues, including borders, security, refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, Israel as a Jewish state and Palestinian prisoners. Who better than the Americans to offer one?

Unfortunately, an American peace plan with any prospect of success presupposes the political clout to make it stick, which the US does not have.

Obama and his administration lack the necessary personal relations, leverage and powers of persuasion necessary to win backing from vital European and Arab allies.

Governments like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, key actors in the past in urging greater flexibility on Abbas and the Palestinian Authority, have serious policy differences with this administration. Moreover, neither is as engaged on Mideast peace as in the past, owing to domestic problems or external challenges.

The president lacks the personal rapport with his Israeli counterpart indispensable to selling an American plan to the Israeli cabinet, Knesset or people. Nor does the president or his secretary of state have the requisite relationship with Abbas or Palestinians.

Therefore, an American peace proposal, regardless of its qualitative merits, is likely to end up on the shelves alongside previously ignored proposals.

So, if no Israeli, Palestinian or American alternative is able to break the ice jam of Mideast peace negotiations, what can happen?

The answer is the least satisfying and most uncertain option. Find a way to keep talking.

Gary Grappo is a retired senior Foreign Service officer from the State Department. He has served in the Middle East, including as US ambassador to the Sultanate of Oman, Head of Mission of the Jerusalem-based Office of the Quartet Representative, and Minister Counselor for Political Affairs at the US Embassy in Baghdad.