Pragmatic realism should govern West’s response to the take over of Crimea

LOS ANGELES —The mismatch of power has been a key feature of the conflict over Crimea.

During the past few weeks, President Vladimir Putin has called the shots and Russia has looked effective and resolute. The take-over of Crimea occurred overnight and without a single casualty.

Domestic support in Russia has been overwhelming, and Moscow quickly capitalized on pro-Russia forces on the peninsula. In true Soviet style, turnout was strong for the referendum and nearly unanimous. Formal annexation was swift.

In contrast, Ukraine and it nominal allies in the West have been caught off guard and have been on the defensive as they seek to cobble together a meaningful and united response.

In addition to an imbalance of power, the conflict over Crimea also is being fought on two different playing fields.

Russia has a narrow set of concrete and firm geopolitical objectives: preserving strategic military assets, recognition of historic territorial claims, ensuring fair treatment of ethnic Russians, and keeping Ukraine as a non-threatening border state.

Ukraine and the West are seeking to uphold a broad set of philosophical ideals: state sovereignty, democratization and economic liberalization and integration.

In short, while Russia forged a new geopolitical reality, Western leaders talk about principles and legality.

The West has the potential to inflict costly economic sanctions on Russia. The country is heavily dependent on imported manufactured goods—everything from farm and construction equipment, to Internet Technology, luxury cars and handbags. The country needs western technology, know-how and investment to exploit its challenging oil and gas deposits and modernize its decrepit infrastructure.

Russia already is paying an economic price for Crimea. The stock market and the ruble have taken a beating—with the currency trading at record lows against the dollar. Putin promised his constituents 5 percent growth but last year, the economy eked out 1.3 percent growth. Two weeks into the Crimean crisis, Morgan Stanley cut its growth outlook to 0.8 percent, and Russia’s VTB Bank said the country could tip into recession.

But, as we saw with the Olympics, cost is no issue when Russian national interests are at stake.

For centuries Russia has been ambivalent about its relationship with the West. Periods of opening have been followed by intervals of closure and reaction. Sanctions and the discipline of the markets are only confirming for Putin and many Russians that the West is implacably hostile. We also know from history that Russia and its people have the ability to enforce unity and endure hardship, especially when the Motherland is threatened.

In the big picture, however, Moscow is facing a tremendous geopolitical loss: Its aggression is converting a once-pliant neighbor into a confirmed enemy. To thwart this, the Kremlin also has an unparalleled ability to assure that Ukraine remains weak and divided —, by massing troops on its borders, inciting unrest by ethnic Russians, threatening energy and trade cutoffs, and jamming the government and economy with cyber attacks.

So, to paraphrase Lenin, What is to be done? It must be acknowledged that Crimea is gone, and, in the near-term, the West can’t protect greater Ukraine with an economic or military security blanket. Rather than hammer away on ideals and prod the Russian bear, the West should deal with reality: Negotiations to assure near-term peace and security and the status quo in and around Ukraine are paramount. Russia has put some proposals along these lines on the table. If anything, talking can buy time.

Longer-term, Western policymakers can focus on building Ukraine’s economic sustainability and political sovereignty, without directly challenging Moscow, to gradually realize the potential of its pivot from Russia.

While the idealism of Western principles is appealing in an uncertain time like this, pragmatic realism about what can be achieved should be heeded.

DJ Peterson is president of Longview Global Advisors, an international political strategy consultancy. He has studied, worked in, and advised on the USSR and Russia for the past 30 years.