Obama’s anti-IS strategy challenged by military and intelligence leaders

DENVER — Is President Obama dealing with cognitive dissonance? First, against all available information, he blames the intelligence community for underestimating the Islamic State. Then, he embarks on a strategy that fails to encompass key elements vital to meeting his mission to “degrade and destroy” ISIS.

Americans were surprised to hear their president’s admission on a recent Sunday “60 Minutes” broadcast that he had “underestimated” the Islamic State – aka, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS/ISIL – and its rapid rise to power and control in Syria and Iraq. Equally stunning, he sought to shift the blame for being caught off-guard to the US intelligence community.

The intelligence community appears to be countering the president’s claim. Officials assert they began warning about ISIS late last year as ISIS took control of greater stretches of the Syrian-Iraqi border. Even the US media reported extensively on ISIS’s rapid advance and capture of Fallujah and Ramadi in the earliest days of this year. The dismal performance of the Iraqi Army was also amply reported.

Sufficient information seems to have been available to anyone willing to listen and reflect on its significance to conclude ISIS was becoming a very serious threat at least as far back as late 2013. Yet, in another stunning presidential admission, in a late August press conference he said that, in fact, he “had no strategy.”

Only in September did Obama face the obvious and announce a strategy for the US to enter the fray with US air assets and halt the ISIS advance. But in this strategy, he again is ignoring fundamental elements — cognitive dissonance — which will either doom the US and coalition’s effort or force a major strategy correction down the road.

First, while he addresses expelling ISIS from Iraq, there is no cogent plan to deal with ISIS in Syria. Pledging to keep American ground troops out of the fight and to expel ISIS from Iraq, the president plans to rely on ground forces from the Iraqi Army, which caved to ISIS fighters not only in Fallujah and Ramadi but also in Mosul just six months later, and from the Kurdish peshmerga militia, marginally more capable but fewer in number With further American training, better arms and US air support, one might allow for the possibility of success, even if its timing remains unknown.

Defeating ISIS will require attacking it on many fronts — ideology, resources, communication and recruitment. But the sine qua non is beating them on the battlefield. Moreover, ground troops are indispensable to winning on the battlefield, irrespective of air superiority, especially in unconventional warfare. Winning on the battlefield means defeating ISIS in Syria as well as in Iraq.

Where are the ground forces to fight ISIS in Syria? The Syrian Army and other Syrian opposition forces have proven nearly as inadequate as the Iraqi army in beating ISIS. So, assuming the Iraqi Army and Kurdish militia can eventually push ISIS out of Iraq, who then takes them on in Syria?

The president’s strategy, other than repeated pledges to arm and train the moderate Syrian opposition, is silent. The president won’t meet his “degrade and destroy” objective without defeating them in both Iraq and Syria.

Second, the US and the coalition it has formed need allies, Sunni allies to be precise. And, they are needed in both Iraq and Syria. There is very little possibility of that happening, even if Haidar al-Abadi, Iraq’s new Prime Minister, invites Sunni Iraqis to rejoin the government in Baghdad.

In 2007, US troops allied with Sunni tribal and political leaders to fight ISIS’s predecessor, Al Qaida in Iraq, in what became known as the Sunni Awakening, or al Sahwa. Iraqi Sunni and their Syrian compatriots – many of whom hail from the same tribes and clans — will now want a reliable guarantor before taking the fight to ISIS.

The Iraqi government, because of the shortsighted sectarian policies of its previous prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, is no position to play that role. And forget about the al Assad regime in Damascus; it is the whole raison d’etre of the Syrian opposition movement, from ISIS to the moderates, most of whom are Sunni.

Nearby Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Jordan, whose own tribes straddle their respective borders with Iraq and Syria, can play an especially helpful role. But the only real guarantor can be the US.

Without some American boots on the ground, it’s hard to see how we might do that. Perhaps the CIA can; it undoubtedly has contacts with the tribes. But the ones the Iraqi Sunnis know, and know they can trust, are the US Army and Marines.

The president insists there will be no American boots on the ground. His armed forces chief, General Martin Dempsey, seems to think otherwise, and that at least some US combat troops may be necessary.

In this case, the president and his military advisers ought to be thinking of deploying US special operators, rangers, marine recon and others to pair up with the Sunnis. Moreover, we may also have to deploy larger numbers of combat units to prove to the Sunnis that we have skin in the game.

In fact, the Iraqis have wisely proposed forming national guard units to defend their own communities and tribal areas. Who better to pair up with such units than this limited number of American combat forces?
However, it is vital that this task be undertaken now. Just as in 2007, it will take months before these special units will be able to re-establish rapport and then train and prepare these units, which some US forces will inevitably have to accompany into battle.

Critics will argue that such a level of US forces involvement starts the US down the slippery slope of large-scale military re-engagement in the Middle East. But, a failure to completely eradicate ISIS in Iraq and Syria and ensure it can never rise again may engender a prospect necessitating even greater US involvement.

Better to commit what is needed now — in Syria as well as Iraq — to ensure the victory we and our allies seek than to gamble on a low-cost, half measure that will mean a protracted conflict with the world’s most diabolically ruthless organization.

Gary Grappo is a retired senior Foreign Service officer from the State Department. He has served in the Middle East, including as US ambassador to the Sultanate of Oman, Head of Mission of the Jerusalem-based Office of the Quartet Representative, and Minister Counselor for Political Affairs at the US Embassy in Baghdad.