Defeating ISIS requires a comprehensive strategy beyond drones and air strikes

DENVER — The US administration seems unable to make up its mind whether the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a war but the objective has been made clear by President Obama, “degrade and defeat” the Islamic State. But how?

ISIS is unlike any terrorist organization faced before. First, it is a ruthlessly diabolical terrorist organization able and willing to employ the worst forms of violence.

Second, it has an army, most recently estimated by the CIA to number up to 30,000 fighters. 

Third, it possesses resources no other terrorist organization has come close to having, holding as much as $300 to $500 million in cash and other financial instruments and earning $1 to $3 million per day from black market oil sales. 

Fourth, ISIS runs an impressive media operation that includes websites, Twitter, Instagram, Facebook and myriad other social media that keep it connected with members, prospective members and supporters. 

Fifth, it recruits aggressively, including among non-Arabs, having swelled its ranks from a mere 10,000 just one year ago. 

Finally, it touts an ideology that appeals to many frustrated and angry Muslims, especially forlorn and forgotten Sunni youth, and to psychopathic killers, such as the British fighter responsible for the beheading of two American journalists, James Foley and Steven Sotloff. 

Degrading and defeating that kind of operation requires much more than air and drone strikes. What is needed is a comprehensive strategy that degrades and eliminates all of the legs on which ISIS stands. Leave even one in place, and it or a facsimile will rise in its place. 

That is what happened in 2008 when US troops allied with Sunni tribes and fighters of the Sahwa, or Sunni Awakening movement, presumably defeated Al Qaida in Iraq, even killing its leader, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, only to see it reemerge in Syria as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, aka ISIS, under Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.

So, first, ISIS must be defeated on the battlefield. That will mean killing or capturing IS fighters and retaking ISIS territory in Iraq and Syria. Without sustained battlefield triumphs, nothing else matters. 

A US plan to defeat ISIS on the battlefield remains unclear. Air power will not be enough. To date, neither Iraqi forces nor the marginally more capable but fewer numbered Kurdish Pesh Merga forces have shown themselves capable of consistently confronting and beating back ISIS. In fact, it is not clear whether these forces alone — along with moderate Syrian partisans, the only ground forces that will be supported and trained by US forces — will ever be able to overcome ISIS’s seasoned and growing fighting force. 

Battlefield victories are the sine qua non. If Iraqi and Kurdish forces are unable to produce them, then the president will face a stark decision: whether to introduce US troops. 

One plan has already emerged. Kim Kagan, Fred Kagan, and Jessica Lewis of the Institute for the Study of War recently released a 29-page strategy for American boots on the ground, calling for 25,000 US combat forces fighting alongside Sunni tribesmen in Iraq and Syria. Call it a “second surge.” If the current coalition is unable to produce sustained battlefield victories within six months — and if the president remains true to his pledge to degrade and defeat ISIS — then deployment of such troops may be inevitable.

Second, ISIS’s resources must be dramatically reduced. That means getting nations to clamp down on ISIS’s elicit oil sales. Turkey and Iraq can be helpful here but if Syria doesn’t also respond, then a major export route may be left available. 

How far the US-led coalition is willing to go to get Syria to take necessary action is unclear. Sanctions are unlikely, given the Russia UN Security Council veto. Will President Obama order attacks against Syrian facilities not directly associated with ISIS in order to stop the flow of ISIS oil?

With oil earnings down, ISIS will then have to resort to living off its assets, which in an intense battlefield scenario would be depleted rapidly. Victories over ISIS would also mean capturing cash, gold and other financial resources of ISIS.

Third, Arab and other Muslim nations must promulgate a comprehensive repudiation of ISIS’s ideology of murder, martyrdom and mayhem, all in the name of Islam. Muslim religious and political leaders must stand together to renounce ISIS’s ideology and notion of a caliphate as antithetical to the faith and present an alternative that accurately reflects the tenets of their faith and reassures non-Muslims.

Fourth, working with their non-Muslim allies, Muslim nations should launch a strategic communication campaign to blunt ISIS’s media juggernaut. That will require unprecedented collaboration between Sunnis and Shia. 

Muslims must be seen to counter ISIS’s message. Attacking ISIS in the media — and especially in the social media space where it’s been so effective — and neutralizing its media are essential to defeating it.

Decisively defeating ISIS on the battlefield, quickly exhausting its financial resources, thoroughly repudiating its barbarous ideology, and effectively undercutting its media operation then allows for tackling recruitment. 

Osama Bin Laden famously remarked that, “People will back a strong horse against a weak one.” Defeat ISIS on the battlefield and it will be seen as weak and attract fewer fighters.

More carefully scrutinizing young travelers to places like Syria and Turkey, particularly from Arab nations but also Europe, and closely policing entry points along the Turkish-Iraqi and Turkish-Syrian borders, can significantly staunch the flow of foreign fighters.

Finally, the US and coalition supporters must unite behind an alternative to ISIS once it’s defeated. That will mean stepping up support for a democratic and inclusive Iraq and supporting a viable opposition to Bashar al Assad in Syria. The latter may take longer. But as long as he remains, Syria will remain a magnet for jihadists as well as more well-intentioned opponents.

The anti-ISIS coalition must ensure that an effective opposition to Assad gains the upper hand. Defeating ISIS in Syria cannot be complete until there is a stable and acceptable governing authority in Damascus.

Gary Grappo is a retired senior foreign service officer from the State Department. He has served in the Middle East, including as US ambassador to the Sultanate of Oman, Head of Mission of the Jerusalem-based Office of the Quartet Representative, and Minister Counselor for Political Affairs at the US Embassy in Baghdad.