A dark anniversary

KABUL, Afghanistan — Eight years after the U.S.-led invasion sent the Taliban packing, the Afghan capital is a very different place. Packs of little girls in white head scarves can be seen on their way to school every morning; at least half the women in Kabul no longer wear burqas.

There is electricity almost 24 hours a day; shiny new shops offer a variety of goods, and there is even a shopping center with a moving escalator. The lucky few with bank cards can get their cash from ATMs and shop in well-stocked supermarkets.

Why, then, is the mood so dark?

Now, more than any time since the heady days of 2001, Afghans are confused, angry and depressed. This anniversary has made little impact on the local population here; the media has paid almost no attention to it. Caught up in their post-election political crisis, few have the time or the patience to look back, in anger or otherwise.

But with President Barack Obama set to make one of the most important decisions of his presidency, it is a good time to take stock of a war that has defied all expectations.

It was, as journalist and writer Ahmad Rashid put it, the best-advertised beginning of a war in recent memory: the whole world watched on Oct. 7, 2001, as the United States, reeling from 9/11, gathered itself to deliver a crushing blow to an enemy who had shattered forever America’s image of itself as an invincible, inviolable power. The punishment to be meted out would destroy Al Qaeda and their allies, assuage the shock and humiliation of the Twin Tower attacks, and show any miscreants what happens to those who try and take on the world’s only superpower.

It did not quite work out that way.

Instead, the United States is bogged down in what increasingly looks like an unwinnable war in Afghanistan.

America is battling a poorly defined enemy, in pursuit of murky goals. Support for the war is waning at home, while in Afghanistan disappointment at the slow pace of reform is rapidly giving way to rage at the failures of the foreign efforts in the country.

Plummeting security, rampant corruption, a flourishing narco-mafia and a badly flawed election have combined to convince many Afghans that the much vaunted "democracy" foisted on them is just another trick being played by an international community intent on furthering its own interests at Afghanistan’s expense.

Much of the misery, of course, is being caused by the Afghans themselves. But that is a tough sell in a populace that feels, with some justification, that it has been alternately victimized and neglected by its neighbors over the past few centuries.

In 2001, most Afghans rejoiced at the departure of the Taliban.

“I was so excited,” recalled Nasimi, a young journalist in Kabul. “Everyone was happy that the Taliban were gone, that those dark days were over.”

He laughs at the memory of lines outside barber shops, as men rushed to rid themselves of the beards the Taliban had insisted they wear. The only problem was that their newly bared chins were a different color from their deeply tanned foreheads, noses, and cheeks.

“Men were running around town with two-toned faces,” he said.

Children were flying kites, music blared from wedding parties, and photo shops arose almost overnight, filling some of the holes left by the Taliban’s harsh, restrictive regime.

But even in those early days, the cracks were beginning to appear.

“As excited as I was, I was also a bit nervous,” admitted Nasimi. “We did not want to see the Northern Alliance back in power.”

That was the first, and, some would say, fatal mistake. In its haste to dub Afghanistan a “fledgling democracy” so that it could turn its attention to more important matters like Iraq, the United States handed power to some of the most widely loathed figures in the country. 

“Did we go through all of this just to see Fahim and Dostum back in power?” grumbled Hafiz, referring to two of the “warlords” who helped to divide and destroy Afghanistan during the civil wars of the early 1990s.

Marshal Mohammad Qasim Fahim, former defense minister, is now first vice president to incumbent-in-waiting Hamid Karzai. General Abdul Rashid Dostum held a high-level post in the presidential administration until a public and violent altercation with a political rival forced him into exile in Turkey. But his support for Karzai in the Aug. 20 elections may yet gain him a seat in the new cabinet.

The years of neglect have taken their toll. The Taliban, so easily routed by U.S. bombs in 2001, are back, and appear to be stronger than ever. They have a firm grip on at least half of the country, and offensive military operations seem to have little effect. The Taliban, like the Hydra of Greek mythology, just grows multiple heads to replace each one that is lopped off.

American forces continue to battle the Taliban, although the stated goal is “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda.” If that is so, then we were done in November 2001. Osama bin Laden and his band scampered over the border to Pakistan almost as soon as ordnance began to explode.

But the international community stayed in Afghanistan, burning down the barn long after the horse had bolted.

Al Qaeda are back now, in a limited way, because the presence of foreign "infidels" on Afghan soil has stirred up the jihadists. And the naturally xenophobic Taliban, whose love for Al Qaeda was never strong, have welcomed them back, because they need all the help they can get.

At present, despite Barack Obama’s toned-down rhetoric, the United States is still engaged in what amounts to a global war on terror, while the Taliban, the vast majority of whom are Afghan Pashtuns, are fighting a war of national liberation.

How do you begin to discuss or resolve a conflict where the adversaries are not even on the same plane?

“The Americans say they will only talk to Taliban who have laid down their weapons,” said Mullah Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, former Taliban foreign minister. “What is there to talk about if you have already surrendered?” 

There is great speculation about what would happen if the foreign troops were to pack up and leave. It would not be pretty: the Taliban have become much tougher during their eight-year jihad. And the newly re-empowered warlords would most likely give them a run for their money. Afghanistan would once again descend into chaos.

But this is not the Afghanistan that the Taliban ruled in 1996. Young men and women now learn languages and computers, they work and study abroad, and know much more about the world outside than did their older brothers and sisters. It would be much more difficult for the Taliban to impose their brutal and repressive regime on an internet-savvy, Twittering population. That is all to the good.

But make no mistake: despite the advantages many Afghans have reaped from the international presence here, just as many would prefer to dispense with our well-meaning but often misdirected “assistance.”

If we do not manage to convince the population of this battered and broken country that they are better off with us here, we will soon find ourselves in an even worse situation. Taliban, insurgents, AOG (armed opposition groups), AGE (anti-government elements) ACM (anti-coalition militia) — we may not be able to come up with enough terms to cover all of the people who will be fighting against us in one way or another.

As the United States re-examines its goals and priorities, and weighs whether or not to ratchet this war up another few notches, the policy planners in Washington should listen to some home-grown truths from Afghanistan.

“We were very tired of fighting in 2001,” said one heavily bearded Pashtun in Kabul. He is a singer, not an insurgent, but the past eight years have made him into a bitter, angry man. “We let the Americans in. But in a few years we will not be tired any more.”