Opinion: Messages from Afghanistan

WASHINGTON — A few weeks ago, over tea and khatai cookies, a senior mullah asked me why the United States was in Afghanistan and what the international community hoped to accomplish there.

The mullah was not ill-informed, and his frank questions were not rhetorical. They reflected the profound lack of trust and understanding that still exists between U.S. officials and their Afghan interlocutors — a problem that must be addressed for any U.S. strategy in Afghanistan to work, with or without 30,000 more troops.

That this mullah and the other tribal elders with whom I shared tea — who were from Khost and provinces in southeastern Afghanistan where the insurgency remains most active — couldn’t describe the goals of soldiers and diplomats in their midst, warrants concern by every American official working in Afghanistan. Even after following the U.S. troop activities for eight years and watching recent strategic debates unfold in the press, they remain confused.

Lack of understanding leads too easily to disaffection. As another mullah noted, the Taliban has already convinced many Afghans that the “U.S. is not here to help. They are just after [our] religion and culture.”

Misunderstanding prevails, for everyone involved, because Afghans and Americans have talked past one another for years. The head of U.S. intelligence in Afghanistan, Major General Michael Flynn, recently drew similar conclusions for U.S. intelligence officers there, publicly reporting that they had little understanding of the local environment and are “disengaged from the people in the best position to find answers.”

Unfortunately, my frank conversation with this group — the Afghan community leaders who, in many ways, have the greatest impact on the local population and the trajectory of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts — suggested that the problem is more widespread and affects multiple facets of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan.

This gives rise to the frustration expressed by a second tribal elder at my meeting, who bemoaned the fact that no American understood his perspective. Along with fellow community leaders, he had tried to provide input to U.S. officials for years but never felt like they were heard. This included discussions with Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the Americans who most often interact with local Afghans. As a result, he described the mood of his community as “quite disappointed these days” and noted his own skepticism of current U.S. efforts.

Injecting humor into the mix, one tribal elder remarked that it was “nice to finally talk with an American who’s not armed.” He welcomed our casual and open exchange but hinted at the underlying wariness that’s dominated American-Afghan conversations for years and haunts our ongoing dialogue. We don’t trust many of our Afghan interlocutors. In turn, they don’t trust us.

Since the group included two ex-Taliban officials and two former detainees, our discussion also touched on General McChrystal’s efforts to overhaul U.S. detention operations and ensure they’re consistent with wider counterinsurgency strategies. These efforts include rehabilitation programs and aim to secure the support of all Afghans, including those in detention. But while everyone applauded this new approach, they also stressed that updated policies didn’t absolve the United States of problems created when its soldiers first arrived in Afghanistan. As one district council member suggested, Afghans have long memories; recent developments were “well and good” but didn’t soothe his own harsh recollections from nine months in custody at Bagram.

Even as U.S. policymakers focus on the immediate future and demand results in a matter of months, these Afghans and their peers view current U.S. actions in the context of years of ongoing conflict, always mindful of what’s gone before. Americans anxious to see quick results from recent strategic shifts will therefore be sorely disappointed if they overlook the enduring effects of U.S. operations in Afghanistan since 2001. As another community leader noted, “even if [there are] changes now, it will take many years for us to get over [the past].”

U.S. troops need the support of these community elders to make a positive difference in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, as my discussions quickly demonstrated, troubled relations with this critical group of Afghans remain a roadblock that’s not easily fixed.

The solution is not just additional efforts to engage Afghans at all levels. It also requires ensuring that the concerns of local Afghans and tribal leaders are raised to the most senior U.S. decision makers and help inform their strategic thinking. And it means providing feedback to our Afghan interlocutors along the way to help maintain an ongoing, two-way dialogue.

Major General Flynn stresses the need to place more focus on local perceptions, but limits his recommendations to the intelligence community; my Afghan companions would suggest that U.S. officials should apply this advice more broadly to help avoid the frustration I heard that morning in Kabul and also encourage more grassroots’ support for U.S. efforts.

Just as critical is the need for increased patience and understanding from U.S. officials, Congress and, especially, the American public. The results of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan will not be immediate or, to the dismay of many, visible in the near future. Improving our dialogue with local Afghans is part of the solution, but the American public must be willing to allow the conversation to unfold on the Afghans’ own timeline.

Marisa L. Porges is an International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. She recently returned from Afghanistan, where she reviewed detention operations and deradicalization efforts. mporges@cfr.org